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Divided They Rule

The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition

Ellen Lust-Okar

Studies of economic adjustment and political liberalization often assume that economic crises promote political unrest. Increased popular discontent over declining standards of living may make it easier for political opponents to mobilize popular discontent and press political demands. Economic reforms also create new winners and losers among political elites. New coalitions of political opponents can form, mobilizing popular frustration to demand political change. Consequently, scholars and policymakers assume that economic crises increase the likelihood of political instability and institutional reform.¹

Morocco and Jordan challenge this assumption. Since the early 1980s both experienced economic decline and increased discontent. In Jordan opponents responded as expected: they increasingly challenged the king. In Morocco, however, the opposition movements did not continue to mobilize the masses behind political reform. Indeed, opponents who had previously taken advantage of increased discontent to challenge the king became unwilling to continue, even as the masses became more frustrated.

How does the structure of government-opposition relationships affect when political elites use economic grievances to mobilize popular opposition? When incumbent elites have not created divisions between opposition groups, opposition elites are more likely to mobilize political unrest during economic crises. However, when incumbent elites have effectively divided political opposition into loyalist and radical camps, opponents are less likely to mobilize unrest as the crisis continues.

Morocco and Jordan are instructive cases. Both are monarchies, in which political power is centered in the palace. The king controls the distribution of resources and determines the political rules. He decides who may formally participate in politics and sets the boundaries within which they may do so.² Monarchs are not alone in creating rules governing political participation; indeed, all incumbent elites manipulate their environments. However, monarchs manage regimes quite openly.

Both Morocco and Jordan also faced prolonged economic crises. Morocco's crisis began after 1975, as phosphate earnings declined and oil prices rose.³ Subsequently, it began implementing IMF structural adjustment programs. Real wages declined,

and unemployment rose throughout the 1980s.⁴ The economic crisis in Jordan began by 1983, when Jordan found itself subsidizing Iraq's war against Iran. In 1988 internal debt increased 47.6 percent over the previous year, and in October Jordan accepted an IMF structural adjustment program. Real wages declined, and unemployment rates reached approximately 20 percent in 1992.⁵

Conventional analyses do not explain the different patterns of political unrest in Morocco and Jordan. For instance, where crises are short-lived or minor, or reform policies are piecemeal, economic crises may create less popular discontent. However, in both Jordan and Morocco reforms have led to an increase in mass discontent. A more developed civil society may allow the opposition to sustain pressure on a regime.⁶ Yet Jordan has a weaker civil society than Morocco.⁷ Unions, an important part of the support for Moroccan opposition parties, may become less capable of mobilizing during economic crises.⁸ However, this argument explains why opponents become less capable of pressing demands, not why they become less willing to do so. There is strong evidence that Morocco's opposition parties are capable of mobilizing the masses but unwilling to do so. Finally, Morocco's opposition elites could simply be more satisfied with their political gains than their Jordanian counterparts. However, the parties' demands and the level of state repression did not change significantly. According to conventional wisdom, once these states experienced unrest, their oppositions should have been expected to remain mobilized until they either obtained their political demands or were repressed. This expectation was not fulfilled.

Mobilization in Divided and Undivided Environments

The distinction between divided and undivided political environments helps explain why political opponents become less willing to mobilize, even though they can do so.⁹ Authoritarian elites determine which opponents may or may not participate in the formal political system. This variation yields three types of political environments. In the undivided, exclusive political environment no political opponents are allowed to participate in the formal political sphere. In the undivided, inclusive environment all political opponents participate in the formal system. Finally, in the divided environment incumbents allow some political opponents to participate in the political system while excluding others.¹⁰

The incentives facing different opposition groups when deciding whether or not to demand political change vary, depending on the groups' types and the political environment. The inclusion of some elites and exclusion of others yield two types of groups: the loyalist and the illegal opposition. Groups can also be distinguished by their ideological demands as moderate or radical. Because incumbents pay lower costs to compromise with moderate groups, in the divided political environment included groups are moderate, and excluded groups are radical.

In divided political environments legal and illegal opponents have divergent interests. As part of their role in relieving popular dissatisfaction, loyalists are allowed to challenge the regime. Thus, loyalists' mobilization costs are smaller than illegal opponents' costs. However, in return for this privilege loyalists agree to help maintain the system; thus, they pay a high price if they destabilize it. In contrast, illegal opponents can capitalize on increasing discontent to mobilize popular unrest. They face higher costs for mobilizing popular protest than their loyalist counterparts. However, unlike loyalists, they are not penalized more for destabilizing the system. Thus, they pay smaller mobilization costs if they join an ongoing conflict than if they mobilize independently.

Consequently, divided and undivided political environments create different protest dynamics. In divided environments loyalists who previously mobilized popular movements may become unwilling to challenge incumbents when crises continue, even if their demands have not been met. Because loyalists have organizational structures and lower costs of mobilizing an independent protest, they are often able to exploit the early stages of crises to demand reforms. However, as crises continue, radicals gain strength and become more likely to join in demonstrations, even if they are unwilling to mobilize independently. Thus, to avoid the possibility that radicals exploit unrest to demand radical reforms, moderates choose not to mobilize. The very same elites who previously exploited economic discontent to demand political change now remain silent, while radicals who might take to the streets if the moderates mobilized are unwilling to do so alone.¹¹ Thus, in a divided environment moderates who previously challenged incumbent elites may choose not to continue to do so when radical groups join, even if incumbents have not accommodated their demands.

In an undivided political environment opponents remain willing to mobilize as crises continue. Loyalists do not fear the inclusion of radicals in their unrest. As the probability of successfully opposing the government increases, the expected utility of conflict increases. With only one opposition group, once the opposition is willing to mobilize, it remains willing as long as its probability of success increases and its demands have not been met. Even when important divisions exist between opposition groups, opponents willing to challenge the regime will continue to do so as economic crises continue. Knowing that another opposition group will challenge does not decrease the willingness of the first to challenge the regime. Thus, as the probability of success increases in an undivided political environment, a moderate group that has previously challenged the government will continue to do so, regardless of the radicals' strategy.

Economic Crises and Political Opposition

The different political environments of Jordan and Morocco explain the divergent dynamics of political unrest in the 1980s. This difference was not an inevitable out-

come of structural conditions. Prior to 1970 both King Husayn and King Hassan II fostered an undivided, exclusive political environment. However, following coup attempts in 1971–1972, King Hassan II reestablished a role for political parties. He signed a new constitution in 1972 and called for local elections in 1976 and national elections in 1977. Although King Husayn also faced political instability, he repressed opposition. He postponed general elections from 1967 until 1989 and closed parliament from 1974 until 1984.

Thus, the monarchs created different political environments. In Morocco political party elites were sharply divided from groups left out of the political system. The palace controlled the loyalist opposition's participation in the political arena and limited its demands. Loyalist opposition elites were required to accept the king's supremacy and support Morocco's bid for the Western Sahara. Within these constraints, however, they acted as the king's "spokesmen of demands," providing an important channel of communication between the masses and the palace and relieving popular frustrations.¹² In return, they enjoyed government subsidies and privileged access to the palace. Illegal opposition, mainly religious-based societies, remained outside this system.¹³ Many questioned the legitimacy of the king and the political system, including the role of the included parties. Despite their potential for antiregime activity, however, King Hassan II allowed the growth of Islamic opposition in the early 1980s, attempting to counter his secular opponents. He thus fostered a divided political environment.

In contrast, King Husayn created an undivided political environment. He allowed the professional associations and the Muslim Brotherhood a limited political role and promoted divisions among opponents. Most notably, he promoted the Muslim Brotherhood to counter secular opponents and played upon divisions between Palestinian and Jordanian opposition elites to weaken the opposition. However, he did not separate opponents into loyalist and radical factions in the formal political system.

Challenge in the Divided Political Environment: Morocco

The divided political environment in Morocco helps to explain why loyalists became less willing to challenge King Hassan II as the crisis continued. The king created incentives for loyalists to refrain from promoting a conflict that excluded opponents could exploit. As radicals became stronger, loyalists became unwilling to mobilize protests to obtain political reforms.

Loyalists exploited the 1981 economic crisis to demand both economic and political changes. Although the government made economic concessions, it rejected political demands and refused to engage in dialogue with the opposition-led

Confédération Démocratique du Travail. Indeed, although it allowed the *Union Maroc du Travail* (UMT), Morocco's progovernment union, to call a general strike, it prohibited the CDT from also striking. It hoped to defuse popular hostility, while containing the CDT.

The opposition nevertheless called a general strike on June 20.¹⁴ The CDT saw the crisis as an opportunity to force the government to make concessions.¹⁵ Held nationally on a Saturday, the strike challenged the regime's ability to maintain control. An energized, angry populace supported "their strike," and in Casablanca and Mohamedia unemployed youths rioted. The armed forces responded. By the end of June 22 there was a large number dead; thousands were arrested; and party newspapers were suspended.¹⁶ On June 23 the parliamentary opposition called for an inquiry into the government's response.¹⁷

The palace responded with economic concessions but also increased security. The king denounced the CDT for instigating the riots and divided Casablanca into five administrative districts to strengthen local control.¹⁸ As the 1983 elections approached, he also dangled the hope of future concessions if party leaders did not repeat the 1981 strikes.

Political contestation in the early 1980s remained primarily between the king and the parties. More radical opponents did not mobilize in concert with the strikes. Within a nonexplosive political environment, the opposition took advantage of the lower mobilization costs accompanying the economic crisis to demand reform, just as the conventional wisdom would predict.

However, as the crisis continued, more radical opponents gained popular support, while legal opponents appeared weak. Loyalists did not want to repeat their experience in the 1981 general strike. They also joined the government in preparation for new elections, with party leader 'Abd al-Rahim Bu'abid appointed minister of state.¹⁹ This appointment put them in a difficult position. They wanted to mobilize against price increases, but they were afraid to sacrifice the chance for gains in the upcoming elections. Thus, they spoke against economic adjustment but did not mobilize a general strike.²⁰

Nevertheless, in January 1984 demonstrations shook the country. In response to increased prices and rumors of impending tuition increases, students took to the streets.²¹ With nearly one-half of its strength located around Casablanca, where the Islamic Summit Conference was convened, the security forces responded slowly. Demonstrations spread to approximately fifty cities and included a wide range of social groups.²² It took nearly three weeks for security forces to restore order. Hassan II then appeared on television, promising not to raise prices on staple goods, something only weeks earlier he had argued was inevitable.²³ By January 23 all was quiet. Approximately one hundred persons were killed, and USFP party members were prosecuted, but the party did not react.

The 1984 riots were far more significant than the 1981 strikes. The demonstrations began without negotiations between the unions and the government. Indeed, although the parties' statements had fueled frustration, the parties did not call a strike. The 1984 rioting lacked a clearly defined leadership in officially recognized channels. This lack was evident in the speech from the throne on July 7. The king, waving a picture of Khomeini and tracts from the illegal opposition group *Ial Amam*, blamed Communists, Marxists, Leninists, and Islamists for the unrest.²⁴ With the costs of mobilization during the Islamic Conference low, social forces outside the official channels of power now challenged the government.

After 1984 both included opponents and the palace recognized that more radical, excluded groups could exploit public dissatisfaction to make demands that neither liked. Consequently, the king sought to strengthen the loyalists' political control. The loyalists, fearing both the high costs of repression and demands of the radicals, became less willing to challenge the palace.

Following the rioting, the king sought to strengthen his control. In a campaign to foster his religious legitimacy he appointed a new minister of Islamic affairs.²⁵ In 1988 he also strengthened nonreligious associations in the larger cities to give individuals an alternative venue for political participation.²⁶ Most important, the palace reinforced the role of the legal political parties. As Zartman noted:

After the 1981 and 1984 riots, the king required all candidates in the September 1984 elections to be members of a party. Henceforth, opposition was to be organized and organizations were to be responsible, thereby enlisting them in the government's job of control. With a common interest in avoiding anomie, government and unions bargain over demands in support of the polity.²⁷

Loyalists hoped the partnership would expand their power, but they were disappointed. During the 1984 elections the nationalist parties, including the *Istiqlal* party, lost parliamentary seats to the promonarchy Constitutional Union.²⁸ The parties also suffered from internal weaknesses, in part due to internal debates over the extent to which they would benefit from cooperating with or challenging the king. By the late 1980s some party leaders argued that, unless they put pressure on the king, they would remain in an unacceptably stifling political situation. In 1989 the king asked the opposition parties to support postponement of the elections for two years to give time for the situation in the Western Sahara to improve. Although relations between the USFP and government were tense, the USFP eventually agreed.

However, when political and economic changes were not made by early 1990, CDT and USFP leaders began to rally for a general strike. By April 1990 the CDT called for a general strike, but other opposition parties refused to join.²⁹ Consequently, the CDT postponed the strike. A stalemate lasted until December. Debates within the parties and discussions between the CDT and the UGTM led to a jointly sponsored strike on December 14, 1990. The government warned public ser-

vants against participating, and security was tightened in Casablanca and Rabat. Yet, while the large coastal cities remained under control, parts of Fes went up in flames.

The violence in Fes mirrored earlier riots. People from the shantytowns rioted; police responded fiercely; death and arrest counts were high; and in the end the government and the unions blamed each other for the devastation.³⁰ The lesson for the palace was that it could no longer contain nationwide popular strikes. Unlike 1981, when the level of discontent may have surprised both sides, or 1984, when the government was caught offguard, the danger of the 1990 strike was understood. The palace had ample time to prepare, and both union and government officials expected it to remain under control.³¹ Nevertheless, even with advanced warning the palace failed to control all parts of Morocco at once.

The palace and loyalist opponents sought to avoid a confrontation that radical opponents might exploit. The king formalized social pact negotiations with the UMT, the UGTM, and the CDT and established advisory councils including opposition members (for example, the *Conseil National de la Jeunesse et de l'Avenir*, CNJA, headed by USFP leader Habib El Malki). It also allowed the opposition to protest against the Gulf War through a well-organized demonstration in Rabat, and in 1992 the king announced plans to revise the constitution.

The opposition parties tried to exploit this opening. They formed the Bloc, or *Kutla*, composed of the *Istiqlal*, USFP, *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP), *Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme* (PPS), and *Organisation de l'Action Démocratique et Populaire* (OADP). This bloc was intended to increase the opposition's bargaining power in the negotiations over constitutional revisions. By presenting a single candidate in each district, it also sought to win more seats. Coordination failed, however, and only the *Istiqlal* and USFP presented a joint slate.

The opposition's demands were not met. In campaigning for the upcoming elections, the parties continued to demand political reforms.³² Furthermore, while direct elections were a success for the opposition parties, indirect elections were disappointing. After the USFP, OADP, PPS, and *Istiqlal* won one hundred of the 222 seats in the direct elections, the minister of interior allegedly stepped in to reverse this success. In the indirect elections the opposition parties and their associated unions won only twenty-two of 111 seats, leading them to call "foul."³³

Although the king offered the opposition a limited role in the government, he would not allow them to mobilize in the streets.³⁴ In February 1994 the CDT called for a general strike, but the UGTM, the UMT, and the opposition parties were unwilling to agree. A UGTM leader explained: "we could smell trouble in the air." The prolonged economic crisis raised levels of frustration. Combined with Ramadan fasting, they feared a general strike would become uncontrollable.³⁵ The king also announced that a general strike would be illegal.³⁶ If the CDT persisted in mobilizing, the penalties would be high. Within twenty-four hours of the deadline, the CDT delayed the strike. Consequently, the king responded publicly and directly to the

union's demands in his throne speech of March 3 and resumed social dialogue.³⁷

By the mid 1990s opposition parties were unwilling to mobilize. In part, they were unwilling due to internal difficulties.³⁸ More important, many feared the demands and inertia of dissatisfaction among the masses. This fear was evident during the railway strike of 1995. Shortly before *Eid al-Idha*, railway workers called a nationwide strike. Their dissatisfaction had been mounting, and at last the three major unions, the UMT, CDT, and UGTM, announced an indefinite strike. Union leaders expected the work stoppage to be relatively short, but their members were prepared for a much longer, harsher struggle. For nearly one month CDT leader Nubir Amaoui tried to call off the strike. He was concerned that a prolonged struggle would lead to violence and that it could possibly spread to and be exploited by other groups. Undoubtedly, it could result in repression of the union and the party. It could also exacerbate already high tensions in the party. Despite his concerns and his popularity as a union and party leader, the strike continued for twenty-eight days, to June 6, 1995.³⁹ It won some concessions, but also demonstrated the extent to which the legal opposition feared an uncontrollable movement.⁴⁰

The opposition ended the strikes despite unmet demands. Opposition parties had recently conducted difficult negotiations with the government. Hoping to entice the opposition parties to join the government, the king had offered them portfolios after the 1994 elections, but they refused, demanding the removal of the minister of the interior, Driss Basri.⁴¹ The king responded that removing the heavy-handed interior minister would "dangerously affect the good running of the sacred institutions," and negotiations broke down.⁴² After nearly one month, Prime Minister Filali formed a cabinet of traditional loyalists, and opposition demands remained unmet.⁴³

The union also thwarted the strikes despite fewer government threats. In contrast to 1994, the palace took a less threatening tone. It argued that the strikes would hurt the economy, but it did not repress the opposition.⁴⁴ It did not need to do so.

The opposition feared that the Islamist opposition would use disorder as a springboard. Islamists in Morocco remained fragmented but were getting stronger.⁴⁵ Through the economic crisis they strengthened their ties with the people by providing social support services that the masses desperately needed. In contrast, the opposition parties seemed impotent and focused on political debates in which the majority of Moroccans had little interest. Islamist activity on the campuses and confrontations between Islamists and secularists became more common. Islamists rioted at the University of Fes in February 1994, leaving five seriously injured.⁴⁶ In addition, Islamists had access to potentially dangerous resources, as the discovery of arms caches in and around Fes in the summer 1994 showed. Party leaders made some efforts to diffuse competition with the Islamists by drawing them into the party structure.⁴⁷ However, the chasm between the two camps was wide. Many Islamists viewed the party system as conservative and ineffective and rallied for a more radical departure from the status quo. Similarly, most party elites considered the

Islamists' agendas to be worse than the current system and worried about Islamists' increasing strength.⁴⁸ Thus, they declined to promote popular unrest, which they feared Islamic elites would harness to demand radical change.

The parties also feared increased repression. Since 1990 the government granted some concessions. The revision of the constitution, public acknowledgment of the union's demands following the proposed general strike in 1994, the removal of Prime Minister Lamrani, a long-time opponent of the unions, and the resumption of social dialogue were all steps toward negotiation with the legal opposition. However, the palace also made it clear that opposition attempts to press demands through popular mobilization would not be tolerated. Party elites, who remembered the repression of the 1960s and the early 1970s under the current minister of interior, knew that, if they promoted unrest, they would pay a very high price.

The opposition parties were thus squeezed between explosion from the bottom and repression from the top, which narrowed their political space and made them less willing to mobilize for political concessions. Loyalists thus preferred to back down than to escalate conflicts with the palace.⁴⁹ As one Moroccan intellectual put it in 1995, "we look at Iraq, Algeria and Iran and know that we are much better off."⁵⁰

Opposition-Government Interactions in an Undivided Environment: Jordan

Unlike Morocco, Jordan's political environment was undivided. In this environment opponents should continue to demand reforms until their demands are met, regardless of minor concessions made over the course of the crisis. They are also more likely to form coalitions across ideological divides.

At the beginning of the economic crisis, all opposition was illegal in Jordan. Nevertheless, political opponents used professional associations, informal organizations, and underground parties and publications to demand reform.⁵¹ In 1982, responding to pressure, the king enlarged the number of appointments to the National Consultative Council (NCC).⁵² The next year, the minister of interior allowed the formation of an illegal political party, the Democratic Unionist Association.⁵³ Finally, in 1984 the king reopened parliament, holding by-elections for empty seats in 1985.⁵⁴

However, none of these changes met opponents' demands. As the economic situation worsened, opponents from secularist and Islamist tendencies as well as Transjordanian and Palestinian origins called for reforms. Most notably, the relationship between Islamists and the king, which was traditionally cooperative, deteriorated by the mid 1980s, largely due to their increased strength.⁵⁵ Islamists in Jordan capitalized on the Iranian revolution, the increased economic discontent after 1983, and their access to governmental institutions (particularly the ministries of education and religious endowments) to gain popular support. By 1985 'Abdallah Akaylah, a

Muslim Brotherhood (MB) representative, estimated that 10 percent of the population supported the Brotherhood.⁵⁶ The MB was the single strongest, best organized political force in the country.

As Islamists gained strength, they demanded reforms. Many in secondary schools and universities argued that the Jordanian monarchy was not “wholly Islamic” and that legislation should be based upon the principles of Islam. The king responded to the increasing discontent by recalling parliament in January 1984, but he did not compromise on the MB’s demands. By 1985 he publicly attacked the Brotherhood.⁵⁷ The *mukhabarat* then moved against some of the MB’s most prominent figures, and the government passed the Law on Sermons and Guidance in Mosques, giving the government the right to censor sermons and ban preachers.⁵⁸

In part, the rift between the Brotherhood and the palace was due to the king’s foreign policies. His engagement with Arafat in the peace process raised considerable opposition, which he hoped to reduce by repressing the MB.⁵⁹ Furthermore, as the economic situation worsened, he turned away from his alliance with Iraq and toward restoring relations with Syria.⁶⁰ Distancing himself from the MB could help, since Syria claimed that Jordan had supported its MB opposition.

Nevertheless, the Islamists in the undivided political environment were not deterred from confronting the king. As the MB gained strength, it became less likely to compromise with the king. Islamists did not fear other groups’ joining in the fray but rather used popular discontent to demand political reforms.

The first unrest occurred in 1986 at Yarmouk University. On May 11 students demonstrated for the revocation of increased fees, the Arabization of the university’s curriculum, an end to rigid control over students’ lives, student representation on university committees, and the release of detained colleagues. Authorities arrested demonstrators, but the protestors grew to nearly 1,500. Students demanded both economic and political reforms. Riot police stormed the campus. Three students were killed, many injured, and nearly 800 arrested. Husayn angrily blamed the Communist party and MB for the unrest, recognizing that the opposition spanned the ideological spectrum and might coalesce.⁶¹

Throughout the late 1980s popular dissatisfaction increased, centering on charges of corruption, limited freedom of speech, the underrepresentation of the urban majority in the NCC, and the failure of national legislation to conform to Islam. Although the government allowed demonstrations in support of the *intifadah* and in May 1988 King Husayn relinquished control over the West Bank, tensions mounted. The government reportedly detained dozens of left-wing opponents.⁶² The regime also dissolved the editorial boards of Jordan’s major newspapers and replaced them with handpicked members. The editor of *al-Ra’i* then wrote, on behalf of the regime, that the professional associations had surpassed their role. As the associations boycotted the paper, the government threatened to shut the associations down, and most believed increased repression was inevitable.⁶³

However, the economic crisis forced Jordan to accept IMF-directed adjustment plans. On April 17, 1989, Jordanians, who had seen their average annual per capita income decline 50 percent in the previous six years, awoke to significant price increases on basic goods.⁶⁴ Nearly immediately, rioting started in the south and spread to Amman. The violence escalated into what some opponents have called the “Jordanian *intifada*,” lasting three days and leaving at least seven killed and thirty-four injured.⁶⁵

Although the parties did not start the rioting, they exploited it to demand reforms.⁶⁶ Underground parties with links to the outlying areas promoted the unrest and pressed their agendas. A broad spectrum of civic organizations issued communiqués demanding reforms: personal freedoms, the lifting of martial law, relegalization of political parties, and the resumption of parliamentary life. They charged the government with nepotism, corruption, and fiscal mismanagement and called for the resignation of Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa’i.⁶⁷

King Husayn recognized the significance of the unrest and returned from the U.S. The Palestinians, often considered the king’s greatest political threat, had refrained from rioting. The violence occurred in the king’s traditional stronghold, among the Transjordanians in the south, demonstrating the level of discontent and the limitations of a system based upon the cooptation of tribal elites. Furthermore, after the riots Jordanians of both East Bank and Palestinian origins voiced similar demands. As a senior government official explained, “the real issue was a popular rejection of a whole government system that does not allow for the minimum required level for political expression of participation.”⁶⁸ Another argued: “the barrier of fear [had] collapsed. People [were] much more aware of their power to make change. They [were] saying, ‘enough is enough.’”⁶⁹

The king announced reform. He changed the government, called the first general elections since 1966, granted political prisoners amnesty, allowed reasonable criticism in the press, and, although martial law remained in effect, allowed political parties to reorganize publicly.⁷⁰ The palace and the opposition also negotiated over the rules of formal political participation. By June 1991 the National Charter (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*) was ratified at a conference of 2,000 leading Jordanians. As in Morocco, legal political parties in Jordan agreed to accept the legitimacy of the monarchy and also to operate without foreign funding or influence.

Political liberalization resulted from economic decline and increased popular discontent that strengthened the opposition.⁷¹ In response to economic difficulties, Palestinians and Transjordanians demanded reform. In a formally undivided political environment all groups were excluded from the system and thus expected to gain from the confrontation. Thus, as the crisis came to a head in 1989, Islamists and secularists, Transjordanians and Palestinians, all demanded reform.

The changes after 1989 were dramatic, but they did not represent a loss in the king’s control. As one observer noted:

What's happening here [in Jordan], then, is new and different—a fundamental, perhaps generational, transition that is both less threatening and more promising than the crisis-mongers would have you believe. Husayn is not so much losing his grip as he is loosening it in a calculated effort to tighten the hold of his Hashemite dynasty.⁷²

Although press freedom increased, newspapers remained subject to close censorship.⁷³ Similarly, the courts remained under the palace's control, with little incentive to challenge the government.⁷⁴ King Husayn changed the political rules but not the distribution of power.⁷⁵

More important, Husayn maintained an undivided political environment.⁷⁶ Moderates, such as Ibrahim 'Izzidine, argued for this strategy. "You cannot deny people the right to organize as they wish. The best thing is to give every group the chance to operate publicly. If you try to suppress any opinion or trend, you will have problems such as we have witnessed in many parts of the world."⁷⁷ Islamist and secular parties, as well as those connected to Transjordanian and Palestinian origins, entered the formal political system.

Although liberalization initially reduced opposition challenges, its demands increased over time. Opposition elites expected that the government would become more accountable and that corruption would decline. This expectation seemed warranted. The king decided to remain neutral during the Gulf War, rather than side with his Saudi and U.S. sponsors, and elites stated that democracy was necessary for economic reform.

However, the expectations went unfulfilled. In part, Husayn sought peace with the Israelis, hoping to rejoin the international community and ease his economic problems. An active, influential opposition could be a stumbling block to a peace agreement, and thus the palace took early measures to check the Islamists. The king appointed only one Islamist, Ishaq Farhan, to the forty-member senate, leaving it dominated by Transjordanian loyalists.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Mudar Badran offered the Muslim Brotherhood only one seat in his first cabinet, which it rejected. Although the palace subsequently allowed the Brotherhood to enter the government as tensions before the Gulf War mounted, it dismissed the government soon after the Gulf War, in June 1991.⁷⁹ Throughout 1991 and 1992 the ministry of interior banned large public meetings held by the Islamists, and in the Political Parties Law of 1992 the government officially barred political parties (broadly interpreted to include the Muslim Brotherhood) from using schools and religious institutions for political activities. Finally, while it accepted the election results, the palace downplayed the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, noting that only 25 percent of voters and only 10 percent of the 1.6 million eligible voters cast ballots for Islamic fundamentalists.⁸⁰

A more significant reversal in liberalization took place after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. King Husayn saw the agreement as removing the major obstacle to forging a separate Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement. Consequently, he

tightened control over policymaking. Revisions in the electoral law issued on August 13, 1993, just months before the November 1993 elections, disadvantaged leftist and Islamic opponents.⁸¹ In addition, the palace limited the roles of both parliament and the cabinet, most notably failing to inform either of the details of the Washington agreement of July 1994 and the Peace Treaty of October 1994 prior to their signing.⁸²

Nevertheless, the treaty exacerbated political tensions. Armed with increased popular discontent over the peace accords and a deteriorating economy and united in a common demand for political power, a broad political coalition formed to oppose Husayn's policies. By early 1995, Islamists and leftists formed an Anti-Normalization Committee, directing their attacks at the king's most fundamental policies and threatening his legitimacy. These attacks not only made the continuation of the peace process more difficult but demanded that the king go beyond the relatively easy political changes that had already been made.⁸³ They demanded significant concessions: more freedoms and a larger policymaking role.

The palace responded with repression. Continued criticism of the peace treaty was disruptive and unacceptable, and those willing to step across these lines would be punished. In November 1995 Prime Minister Zayd Bin Shakir warned that "any denial of [Jordan's] achievements is tantamount to treason" and took steps to tighten the Press Law to "safeguard a 'responsible' press."⁸⁴ One month later King Husayn repeated that he was prepared for "a show-down with the opponents of his policies towards Israel and in the region generally."⁸⁵ In part, he was reacting angrily to Jordanian opposition to the peace treaty, which only intensified after Jordanians watched King Husayn and Queen Noor grieve the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.⁸⁶ Yet, even when the peace treaty became a *fait accompli*, the escalation continued.

In an undivided political environment during a prolonged economic crisis, the opposition remained united. In 1996 the economic situation deteriorated. The government announced that it would once again lower bread subsidies, raising prices by 300 percent. Despite King Husayn's personal appeal on July 12 to Jordanians to support the government's decision, opposition escalated. On July 21 activists broke into the parliament on the first day of the extraordinary session. Parliamentary opposition members from the left to the Islamists spoke strongly against the price increases. Petitioners presented 30,000 signatures, including forty-one members of parliament, asking the government not to increase prices, and the parliamentary opposition warned that the government could face a no confidence vote.⁸⁷ Yet on August 16 the government raised bread prices while King Husayn closed the parliamentary session. Widespread public rioting shook Jordan for a second time in less than a decade, and the palace responded by calling in army units and imposing a curfew.⁸⁸

The palace clamped down. Ignoring the opposition, it sponsored the 1997 Press and Publication Law, providing more restrictions on publications and more severe

penalties for infractions.⁸⁹ It also refused to engage in serious dialogue with the opposition about revising the 1993 Electoral Law. As a result, ten opposition parties boycotted the upcoming elections. Turnout nationally was a low 54.5 percent and in urban areas, where political parties were strong, as low as 20 percent.⁹⁰ Once again, the opposition coalition spanned ideological tendencies and the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide and was willing to pressure the king.⁹¹

As popular support for Husayn reached a nadir, the opposition called for public demonstrations in support of Iraq. The government banned the demonstrations, in marked contrast to the 1991 Gulf War. The opposition risked crossing the line by mobilizing the demonstrations despite the prohibition. On February 13, 1998, over 2,000 opponents protested after Friday prayers at a mosque in Amman. The following week demonstrators marched in the typically loyalist southern town of Ma'an, ending in a three day confrontation that left one killed and the town under curfew.

Nevertheless, the opposition remained united. By June 13, 1998, its members, now including the nine political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, the lawyers syndicate, and eleven prominent individuals, came together formally to form the Conference for National Reform. Despite continued threats of repression, it held its first national congress on July 25, 1998.

The importance of this broad coalition should not be understated. There is little love lost among the opposition groups. Secularist-Islamist tensions are high, and the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide is deep. Indeed, in 1989 some Islamists accused a prominent female secularist candidate, Toujan Faysal, of "apostasy," declaring her incompetent, dissolving her marriage, and promising immunity to anyone who would "shed her blood."⁹² Furthermore, even after King Husayn's relinquishment of the West Bank alleviated tensions, there were important differences between Transjordanian and Palestinian views. Finally, power struggles between the coalition partners constantly threatened to tear them apart.⁹³ Yet the coalition continued to challenge the king.

In the undivided political environment such spiraling conflict between the king and the opposition is expected. As the economic situation deteriorates, the probability that the opposition can succeed in mobilizing unrest increases. Because no political opponents will be disadvantaged in an exploited conflict, they are willing to coalesce to press their demands. The king's only hope of controlling the situation is to coopt greater portions of the political field, while increasing the costs of mobilization through greater repression. Not surprisingly, by 1998 most activists and observers agreed that the system had returned nearly full circle to the dark year of 1988.⁹⁴

Yet, while opposition groups feared the king's retribution, they did not fear each other. Indeed, repression only united them further. Political pluralism and a joint struggle to obtain it can benefit all. As MB leader Khalil al-Shubaki explained with regard to the Brotherhood's cooperation with leftist parties: "It is coordination over a

common cause. It does not mean that we recognize the legitimacy of their thoughts. We believe in political pluralism as long as it is within the general Islamic framework. What we want for ourselves, we want it for others too.”⁹⁵

Conclusion

The dynamics of political unrest during periods of economic crisis should vary systematically, depending on political environment. In an undivided environment political demands increase as popular discontent increases. During prolonged economic crises political opponents become more likely to demand political change. Their coalitions also widen as the crises continue. In a divided environment loyalists become less likely to press for political change. During prolonged economic crises excluded political contenders expand their popular support. This opposition becomes increasingly threatening to both the government and the loyalist opposition, and it nearly paralyzes the latter. Loyalist elites, fearing that radical forces may exploit political instability to press their own demands, become unwilling to mobilize the masses against incumbents.

It is thus theoretically rewarding to extend the analysis of government-opposition relations to include the way incumbents structure relations between competing opposition groups. The influence of political environments is not limited to monarchies. For instance, in Egypt the divided environment under Mubarak has helped keep the loyalist opposition in check, particularly in the early to mid 1990s. Similarly, in Iran the shah’s decision to eliminate competing opposition parties in the mid 1970s removed the last vestiges of legitimacy from the party system. In the resulting undivided system, a broad coalition of opposition forces united to overthrow the shah.

Despite the importance of political environments, many questions remain unanswered. The most difficult is why incumbents promote certain institutional arrangements. Why do they admit a wider or narrower portion of political constituencies to the formal system? It is much more difficult to explain why than to examine how these institutions affect political behavior. Second, how well do incumbents in these institutional arrangements withstand severe political challenges? When does a degree of political liberalization limit opponents’ demands, and when does it provide fuel for greater mobilization? Preliminary research suggests that a weak security system, in which opposition groups can exploit some political unrest, may help reduce opposition in the divided but not in the undivided environment. To understand fully the prospects for political reform in authoritarian states, it is necessary to explain more fully how incumbents promote and preserve different relations among their political opponents.

NOTES

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1. See Robert Bates, "The Impulse of Reform in Africa," in Jennifer Widner, ed., *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). For empirical support, see Susan C. Stokes, "Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990–1995," *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (October 1996), 544–65; Jorge Buendia, "Economic Reform, Public Opinion and Presidential Approval in Mexico, 1988–1993," *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (October 1996), 566–91. See also, Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, eds., *Privatisation and Liberalization in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954–1984," *Comparative Politics*, 19 (October 1986), 1–24; Joan M. Nelson, ed., *Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Henri J. Barkey ed., *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (October 1996), 23–42; Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy, *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East* (London: British Academic Press, 1993); Richard Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Adjustment Crises in the Third World* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984). As Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), argue, not all economic crises yield political change, and not all regime changes are preceded by economic crises. While their work focuses on how regime types influence the likelihood of political change, this article examines how the ways regime types structure relationships between opposition groups influence the level of pressure on them during economic crises. Even similar regime types can experience very different changes in political opposition during economic crises.

2. See Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Laurie Brand, *Women, the State and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); P. A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Fathi H. Schirin, *Jordan: An Invented Nation?* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1994); S. A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Mustapha Sehim, "Les élites ministérielles au Maroc: Constantes et variables," in J. Santucci, ed., *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1992); I. William Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," in Giacomo Luciani ed., *The Arab State* (London: Routledge, 1990); Driss Ben Ali, "Changement de pacte sociale et continuité de l'ordre au Maroc," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: CNRS, 1989), pp. 51–72; John Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

3. Abdelkader Berrada and M. Said Saadi, "Le grand capital privé marocain," in *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1992), pp. 313–23; Habib El Malki, *Trente ans d'économie marocaine 1960–1990* (Paris: CNRS, 1989); Hanane Larbi and Rachid Sbihi, *Économie marocaine: Une radioscopie* (Rabat: Al Maarif

Al Jadida, 1986); Serge Leymarie and Jean Tripier, *Maroc: Le prochain dragon?* (Paris: Editions EDDIF, 1992); Habib El Malki, "L'endettement international du Maroc: Un fait de longue durée?," in Abdelali Doumou, ed., *L'État Marocain dans le durée (1850-1985)* (Mohammedia: Fedala, 1987), pp. 153-72; Rhys Payne, "Economic Crisis and Policy Reform," in I. William Zartman and Mark Habeeb, eds., *Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa* (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 139-67; Driss Khrouz, *L'économie marocaine: Les raisons de la crise* (Casablanca: Les Éditions Maghébines, 1988); Chaouki Benazzou and Tawfik Mouline, *Panorama économique du Maroc, 1985-1990* (Rabat: El Maarif Al Jadida, 1993).

4. The unemployment rate among those with secondary education grew from 27.6 percent in 1984 to 43.4 percent in 1990. Direction de la Statistique, *La Population Active Urbaine* (Rabat: Direction de la Statistique, 1990); Direction de la Statistique, *La Population Active Urbaine* (Rabat: Direction de la Statistique, 1993).

5. *Jordan Times*, July 22, 1992.

6. John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vols. 1 and 2 (London: E. J. Brill, 1995, 1996); also, Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978). States can use civil society as a control mechanism. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control," *Comparative Politics*, 33 (October 2000), 43-61.

7. In Jordan all political parties were driven underground in 1957, and the trade unions were effectively depoliticized in the early 1970s. In Morocco political parties operated openly from the early 1970s, and the two main opposition parties, the USFP and *Istiqlal*, have close ties with large unions, the *Confédération Démocratique du Travail* (CDT), tied to the USFP, and the *Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc* (UGTM), tied to the *Istiqlal*.

8. Barbara Geddes, "Economic Reform and Democracy: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (October 1994), 104-18.

9. This analysis relies on rational choice theory, which provides the most room to examine the effects of state-provided, negative incentives to participation on the dynamics of political opposition.

10. This typology overlaps in part with those of Dahl and Tilly, but neither examines the effects of divisions in the formal system on the opposition's willingness to mobilize. See Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Tilly, ch. 3. Although informal institutions are important, this analysis focuses on the role the formal institutions play in influencing the dynamics of political opposition. It thus has some commonalities with work on political opportunity structures in social movement theory. See, for instance, J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

11. For a more formal presentation of this argument, see Ellen Lust-Okar, *State Management of Political Opposition: Lessons from the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.)

12. Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," p. 223.

13. Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Remy Leveau, "Islam et contrôle politique au Maroc," in Françoise Burgat and William Dowell, eds., *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); Abderrahim Lamchichi, *Islam et contestation au Maghreb* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989); Driss Ben Ali, "Émergence de l'espace socio-politique et stratégie de l'état au Maroc," in Ali Sedjari ed., *État, Espace et Pouvoir Locale* (Rabat: Les éditions guessous, 1991), pp. 61-74.

14. See *Itihad Ishitiraki*, June 12, 1981. The UMT leadership argued, however: "18 juin 1981: succès total de la grève générale à Casablanca et Mohammadia dans l'ordre, la détermination, l'enthousiasme et la responsabilité." *L'Avant garde*, June 18, 1981, p. 1.

15. Interviews with party leaders, members, and observers.

16. The minister of interior recorded sixty-six deaths and eleven injuries; opposition parties, the *Association des Marocains en France*, and a Canadian member of the International Commission of Jurists argued that 600–1,000 died. *Le Monde*, July 1, 1981; *Africa Diary*, Nov. 19–25, 1981, pp. 10747–48. The USFP and CDT claimed that 162 of their members were arrested. *Maroc Soir*, June 28, 1981; *Al Bayane*, July 16, 1981.
17. Muhammad Jibril, “Les événements et les problèmes de fond,” *Lamalif*, 127 (July–August 1981), 28–31; *Maroc Soir*, June 27, 1981.
18. *Le Temps*, July 10, 1981.
19. *Africa Diary*, Oct. 9–15, 1983, p. 11621.
20. Interview with Dr. ‘Abdalmajid Bouzouba, Adjoint Secretary General and Secretary of Information of CDT, Council Member of USFP, Rabat, July 14, 1995. Other party members and observers confirmed this insight.
21. Prices increased 67 percent on butter, 33 percent on cooking oil, and 16 percent on lump sugar.
22. The most serious demonstrations took place in al-Hoceima, Nador, and Tetouan in the north. See Jean-François Clément, “Les révoltes urbaines,” *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1993), pp. 392–406; Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 156; Majdi Majid, *Les luttes de classes au Maroc depuis l’indépendance* (Rotterdam: Editions Hiwar, 1987).
23. *Washington Post*, Jan. 23, 1984.
24. *Africa Diary*, July 1–7, 1984, p. 11944; David Seddon, “Popular Protest and Political Opposition in Tunisian [sic], Morocco, and Sudan 1984–1985,” in Kenneth Brown, ed., *État, ville et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: CNRS, 1986), pp. 179–97.
25. Sam Younger, “Morocco and Western Sahara,” *Africa Review*, 9 (1985), 205–11.
26. For example, the Grand Atlas in Marakesh, Bou Regreg at Sale, Fes-Saïss in Fes, Angad Maroc Oriental in Oujda, and Figuig and Taza and the Mediterranean in Tangier. Their leaders included El Hadj Mediouri (head of royal security), Muhammad Awad (palace adviser), Muhammad Kebbaj (minister of finance), Ahmad Osman (king’s brother-in-law and former prime minister), and Maati Bouabid (former prime minister).
27. Zartman, “Opposition as Support of the State,” p. 230.
28. The Constitutional Union received 24.79 percent of the votes (eighty-three seats); USFP 12.39 percent (thirty-nine seats); and *Istiqlal* 15.33 percent (forty-three seats). “Une nouvelle géographie politique,” *Lamalif* (October 1984), 4–5; Alain Claisse, “Élections communales et législatives au Maroc,” *Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord*, 1985 (Paris: CNRS, 1987), pp. 631–68.
29. Interview with Mustapha Terrab, adviser to King Hassan II, Rabat, July 12, 1995; interview with Bouzouba; ‘Ali Yata (secretary general of the PPS, MP), “Le PPS, la question nationale et le mouvement national et progressiste,” *Économie et Socialisme*, 11 (January 1992), 87–114.
30. Hizb al-Istiqlal, *Hizb al-Istiqlal Bayna al-Mu’tamarayn (1985–1994)* (Rabat: Al Sharakat al-Maghrabia, 1995); Lijnat al-Tansiq al-Watani wal-Dawli, *Nubir Amaoui, Rajal wa Qadiah* (Casablanca: Matba’a Dar al-Nashir al-Maghrabi, 1993); Robert Radcliffe, “Fulbright Student Letter, Fez, Morocco, December 20, 1990,” unpublished manuscript.
31. Interview with Muhammed El Merghadi, member, USFP, Fes, May 16, 1995; Nubir Amaoui, Secretary General of CDT, member of USFP central committee, Casablanca, May 1995; Bouzouba.
32. FBIS–NES–93–179, Sept. 17, 1993.
33. The MP won fifty-four seats; UC, sixty-six seats; PND, twenty-two seats. In the democratic block, the USFP won fifty-three seats; *Istiqlal*, forty-nine seats; PPS, fifteen seats; OADP, two seats; CDT, four seats; and UGTM, two seats. Among the loyalist parties, the RNI won thirty-three seats; MNP, twenty-five seats; PDI, three seats; UMT, three seats; and independents, two seats. FBIS–NES–93–181, Sept. 21, 1993. Henry Munson, Jr. “International Election Monitoring: A Critique Based on One Monitor’s Experience in Morocco,” *MERIP*, 209 (Winter 1998), 37–39; Henry Munson, Jr., “The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco,” in Rahma Bourgia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds., *In the Shadow of the*

Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp. 259–81; Thomas C. Bayer, *Morocco: Direct Legislative Elections Monitoring/Observation Report* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1993).

34. The opposition refused to join the government, arguing that real political change was impossible if Driss Basri remained in office. Limited government participation might also have weakened the parties. *Middle East Economic Digest Quarterly Report* (November 1993), 12; interviews with party leaders; *Le Matin du Sahara*, Oct. 9, 1993, cited in A. Agnouche, “La fiction de l’alternance politique au Maroc,” manuscript; Susan Waltz, “Interpreting Political Reform in Morocco,” in Bourgia and Miller, eds., pp. 282–305.

35. Interviews with party and union members from both the *Istiqlal*/UGTM and USFP/CDT.

36. Under Article 14 of the constitution, a law would outline conditions for strikes. Since the law had not yet been drafted, the king argued that he could declare the planned strike illegal.

37. Most notably, the king dismissed Prime Minister Lamrani, who was hostile to trade unions, and appointed Prime Minister Filali.

38. At this time there were major changes in the OADP leadership, explosions within the USFP, and for a first time a fervently divisive PPS congress. *La Vie Économique*, July 28, 1995, pp. 3–4; *Maroc Hebdo*, July 28–Sept. 7, 1995, pp. 6–7; *La Vie Économique*, July 21, 1995, pp. 3–4; *Maroc Hebdo*, July 21–27, 1995, pp. 24–25; interviews with party members.

39. It was widely rumored that union and party leaders shared these concerns. Interviews with party members and with a western diplomat, Rabat, June 27, 1995.

40. The unions were reimbursed half salary for the strike period and won an annual bonus and a new national advisory council. *Ittihad Ishtiraki*, June 3, 1995, p. 1.

41. Driss Basri was dismissed only when King Muhammad VI assumed the throne after his father’s death. See FBIS–NES–95–007, Jan. 11, 1995, p. 19.

42. FBIS–NES–95–008, Jan. 12, 1995, pp. 15–16; FBIS–NES–95–010, Jan. 17, 1995, p. 129.

43. The cabinet included the MP, UC, and PND; Ahmed Osman’s RNI and Mahjoubi Ahardan’s MNP remained outside government due to a dispute over their choice of ministers and portfolios. FBIS–NES–95–035, Mar. 22, 1995, p. 23; FBIS–NES–95–040, Mar. 29, 1995, p. 37; FBIS–NES–95–238, Dec. 12, 1995, p. 22.

44. Interviews with party and nonparty members, 1995.

45. USFP internal memorandum, cited in *Jeune Afrique*, June 22–28, 1995, pp. 16–17. Politically involved Moroccans who voiced concerns of increasing Islamist strength and the related threat of military intervention included Najeeb Akesbi, member of USFP, Professor of Economics, Agricultural Institute, Rabat, July 13, 1995; Abdelhay Mouddeh, Professor of Political Science, Rabat, July 6, 1995; Abdallah Saaf, Professor of Political Science, Mohamad V University, Rabat, July 24, 1995; Aissa Elouardighi, member of Central Committee of OADP, member of SNU-Sep, Rabat, June 26, 1995; also, U.S. Economic Officer, Casablanca, March 8, 1995.

46. *Foreign Report*, Feb. 24, 1994, pp. 1–2.

47. For example, a Friday Islamic supplement in the *Istiqlal* party newspaper and the USFP’s return of Mohammad Basri. *Maghreb: MEED Quarterly Report* (November 1993), 24–25.

48. As Clement Henry Moore, “Political Parties,” in Zartman and Habeeb, eds., pp. 42–67, noted, “time may be running out for the parties.” Similar concerns were expressed in a meeting of PPS youth before the 1995 national congress, Centre d’Étude et de Recherche Aziz Bellal, Rabat, July 8, 1995, and in an interview with Hafez Amiri, USFP member and youth recruiter, Rabat, July 7, 1995. The U.S. Political Officer in Casablanca estimated that, among youth, Islamists outnumbered leftists ten to one. Interview, Casablanca, March 8, 1995.

49. Party members noted “now was not the time” to mobilize the masses, but students argued that the parties had become unwilling to challenge the palace. Interviews with observers, economics students, and party members, 1995.

50. Interview with Moudden. Other party members and the U.S. Political Officer concurred, Rabat, 1995.
51. In March 1982 a notable family published *al-Ufuq Al-Iqtisadi* to campaign for democratic freedoms. The government stopped it after twenty weeks.
52. The NCC was established in 1978 with no power to set or reject legislation. It served primarily to "co-opt intellectuals and businessmen, to appease the traditional sectors of society and to mobilize support for the regime." A. W. Khouri, "The National Consultative Council," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 427–39.
53. Interview with Jamal Sha'ir, April 27, 1997.
54. Fathi, p. 103. Some suggest the he opened parliament also in preparation for Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian peace talks. *Washington Post*, Jan. 10, 1984, p. A10.
55. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations*.
56. *Washington Post*, Dec. 27, 1985, p. A21.
57. *Jordan Times*, Nov. 11, 1985, p. 1.
58. Most prominent was Akayla, forced to resign from his position in the ministry of education and barred from returning to the University of Jordan. In total, the government "retired" seven Ikhwan from their positions in the education ministry.
59. *Washington Post*, Dec. 27, 1985, p. A21.
60. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Alliances*.
61. *The Middle East* (July 1986), 12.
62. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 13, 1988, p. 9.
63. First noted in an interview with Muhammad Masri, researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, Amman, November 10, 1995; other Jordanians and western observers concurred.
64. Income declined from \$1,800 per capita in 1982 to \$900 in 1988. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 1988, p. 4.
65. *Washington Post*, Apr. 21, 1989, p. A22, Apr. 24, 1989, p. A11.
66. Interviews with Radwan 'Abdallah, November 1995; 'Issa Madanat, November 20, 1995; *Washington Post*, Apr. 14, 1989, Apr. 22, 1989, pp. A1, 20.
67. *Washington Post*, Apr. 22, 1989, pp. A1, 20.
68. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 1989, p. 4.
69. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, 1988, p. 3; *Washington Post*, Mar. 14, 1989, p. A21.
70. Kamel S. Abu Jaber and Schirin H. Fathi, "The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections," *Orient*, 31 (March 1990), 67–86; Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies*, 32 (February 1999), 100–29; Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30 (August 1998), 387–410. Twenty-two Muslim Brotherhood adherents, fifteen Islamists with other affiliations, and ten secular antigovernment candidates were elected. Mudar Badran was appointed prime minister because of his better ties with Islamists.
71. Public opinion is based upon how well the economic grievances were met, not the political demands. Center for Strategic Studies, *Public Opinion Survey on Democracy in Jordan, Preliminary Findings* (Amman: University of Jordan, March 1993), p. 3.
72. *Washington Post*, Oct. 3, 1989, p. 3.
73. George Hawatmeh, "The Changing Role of the Press," in George Hawatmeh, ed., *The Role of the Media in Democracy: The Case of Jordan* (Amman: University of Jordan, 1995), p. 9.
74. Ahmad Obeidat, "Democracy in Jordan and Judicial Control: The Actual Situation," in H. Dobers, W. Goussous, and Y. Sara, eds., *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Jordan* (Amman: Jordanian Printing Press, 1992), pp. 39–47.
75. Discussion in the Report of the Committee of Formulation of Conclusions," in Dobers, Goussous, and Sara, eds. pp. 92–121.

76. Two radical groups remain on the fringe: Islamic *Jihad al-Bait al-Muqaddas* and *Hizb al-Tahrir*. Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori, ed., *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp. 88–108; Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996). Also, Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).
77. *Jordan Times* (Amman), July 27, 1993.
78. Abu Jaber and Fathi, pp. 61–83.
79. Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in Piscatori, ed., pp. 88–108.
80. *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 16, 1989, p. 4.
81. Previously, voters cast ballots for as many candidates as there were seats in the multimember districts. Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, *Post-Election Seminar: A Discussion of Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary Election* (Amman: al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1995).
82. The palace dominated the executive branch after liberalization. Noted by Jordanian activists, non-activists, and western observers, 1995.
83. A study conducted in 1994 found 80 percent of Jordanians opposed the peace treaty. Economic Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Jordan*, 4 (1994), 8.
84. *Jordan Times*, Nov. 19, 1995, p. 1, Dec. 1, 1995, p. 1; Abdul Karim Kabariti (Minister of Foreign Affairs), "Opening Remarks," Seminar on Democracy and Rule of Law, Amman, November 19, 1995 (author's notes).
85. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan: Democratization in Danger," *Middle East International*, Dec. 15, 1995, pp. 16–17. The arrest of Islamist Layth Shubaylat on December 9, 1995, sent a signal to opponents of normalization. *Jordan Times*, Dec. 10, 1995.
86. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, King Husayn's partner in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, was assassinated on November 4, 1995. The author witnessed Jordanians watching as the official television station carried a live broadcast of clearly distraught King Husayn and Queen Noor attending the funeral. Jordanians, many of whom sympathized with the Islamist paper's headline, "Death of a Murderer," were shocked.
87. *Middle East International*, Aug. 2, 1996, p. 11.
88. Curtis Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund," *Middle East Policy*, 6 (October 1998), 54–66.
89. Russell Lucas, "Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action and Path Dependence in Jordan" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2000).
90. *Middle East International*, Dec. 5, 1997, pp. 12–13.
91. Boycotting parties included the Islamic Action Front, Jordanian People's Unity Party, HASHD, the Constitutional Front Party, the Jordanian Arab Partisans Party, and the Nationalist Action Party (*al-Haqq*). Former interior minister Sulayman 'Arar, leading the Mustaqbal Party, and former prime ministers Taher al-Masri and Ahmed 'Ubaydat joined the boycott.
92. *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 2, 1989; interviews with Toujan Feisel and Issa Madanat, November 1995.
93. Interviews with academics and party members, 1995, 1998; *Jordan Times*, June 17, 1992, pp. 1, 5.
94. Interviews with party elites and observers in 1998.
95. *Jordan Times*, Oct. 12–13, 1995, p. A1; Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case Jordan," *Middle East Journal*, 51 (Summer 1997), 373–87.